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Abstract 
In this paper I analyze a previously unpublished Leibniz text from the early 1700s. I give it 
the title “On unities and transmigration” since it contains an outline of his doctrine of unities 
and an examination of the doctrine of transmigration. The text is valuable because in it 
Leibniz considers three very specific versions of transmigration that he does not address 
elsewhere in his writings; these are: (1) where a soul is released by the destruction of its body 
and is then free to pass into another body; (2) where souls are exchanged without any 
destruction of bodies; and (3) where human souls (minds) are exchanged, again without any 
destruction of bodies. I show that when tackling these three versions of transmigration in “On 
unities and transmigration”, Leibniz develops a series of objections that are not to be found 
anywhere else in his published writings, despite his lifelong opposition to the doctrine of 
transmigration. This paper is completed by two appendices, the first of which presents the 
previously-unpublished “On unities and transmigration” text in full, in the original French 
(with all deletions indicated), while the second presents it in English translation. 
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It is remarkable that even three hundred years after his death in 1716, Leibniz’s 
corpus has still not been published in its entirety, and that the full range and depth of his 
thinking is still not fully known. As a good illustration, I present here a previously 
unpublished metaphysical text that will eventually be included in volume 5 of series VI of the 
Akademie edition, which collects together Leibniz’s philosophical writings. The text in 
question begins with Leibniz outlining his doctrine of unities and then drawing out its 
implications, before moving on to consider the doctrine of transmigration (though curiously 
he does not make use of the term). In this latter part, Leibniz presents a series of objections to 
transmigration, many of which are, to the best of my knowledge, unique to this text. 
The text itself exists only as a draft, and looks to be what we might call a “working 
paper” in which Leibniz thinks through a problem as he writes. He left the text without a title, 
but as its principal themes are unities and transmigration, I propose to refer to it as “On 
unities and transmigration”.1 Paul Ritter, compiler of the Ritterkatalog, dated the text to 
1691,2 but the Akademie editors propose a later date of 1702 on the basis that the text was 
found in the middle of a pile of papers dating from that year, including a sketch of a letter to 
Bayle from December 1702.3 Internal evidence supports this dating, and possibly even a 
slightly later one. Leibniz’s liberal use of “unities” is certainly consistent with that of other 
writings from the early 1700s.4 However, more noteworthy is his use of the terms “physical 
                                                          
1 The text has been given the provisional title of “De l’ame et du corps” [On the soul and body] by the 
Akademie editors. 
2 See the entry in the online Ritterkatalog: 
http://ritter.bbaw.de/ritter/Suche/Datenblatt/suche_datenblatt?ort=&jahr1=&jahr2=&adressat=&absender=&IN
CIPIT=&Titel=&SIGN_oL=LBr%2040%20Bl.%2022&sort=Titel&anzeige:int=1 [accessed 18 August 2016] 
3 The editor in question is Stefan Luckscheiter. 
4 See for example “The soul and its operations”, 12 June 1700, A I 18: 113–117/LTS 197-202. In this paper I 
use the following abbreviations when referring to Leibniz’s works: 
A = Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, eds. Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 1923-). Multiple volumes in 8 series, cited by series (reihe) and volume (band). 
AG = Philosophical Essays, trans. and ed. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989). 
DSR = De summa rerum, trans. and ed. G. H. R. Parkinson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). 
FC = Lettres et Opuscules Inedits de Leibniz, ed. Louis Alexandre Foucher de Careil (Paris: Ladrange, 1854). 
G = Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ed. C. I. Gerhardt, 7 vols (Berlin: Weidmann, 
1875-1890). 
GM = Mathematische Schriften, ed. C. I. Gerhardt, 7 volumes (Berlin: A. Asher, 1849-1863). 
K = Die Werke von Leibniz, ed. Onno Klopp, 11 volumes (Hanover: Klindworth, 1864-1884). 
L = Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. and ed. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969). 
LBr = unpublished manuscript held by the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Bibliothek, Hannover. 
LDV = The Leibniz-De Volder Correspondence, trans. and ed. Paul Lodge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2013). 
LH = unpublished manuscript held by the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Bibliothek, Hannover. 
LM = Leibniz’s Monadology, trans. and ed. Lloyd Strickland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014). 
LNS = Leibniz’s ‘New System’, trans. and ed. R. S. Woolhouse and Richard Francks (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997). 
LTS = Leibniz and the Two Sophies, trans. and ed. Lloyd Strickland (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2011). 
NE = New Essays on Human Understanding, trans. and ed. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
PW = Philosophical Writings, trans. Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson, ed. G. H. R. Parkinson (London: 
Dent, 1973). 
RIS = Réfutation inédite de Spinoza, ed. Louis Alexandre Foucher de Careil (Paris: E. Brière, 1854). 
RRDS = A Refutation Recently Discovered of Spinoza by Leibniz, trans. Rev. Octavius Freire Owen (Edinburgh: 
Thomas Constable and Co., 1855). 
SLT = Shorter Leibniz Texts, trans. and ed. Lloyd Strickland (London: Continuum, 2006). 
When quoting from these sources, I cite the original language source first, followed by that of an English 
translation, where available. Where no English translation is available the translation is my own. 
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identity” and “moral identity”; both are used in the New Essays on Human Understanding of 
1703-5, and as far as I can tell, entered Leibniz’s philosophical vocabulary around that time. 
In “On unities and transmigration”, he employs the terms as though they are already 
established rather than being newly coined, suggesting that the text may be contemporaneous 
with the New Essays. In addition, as we shall see, some of Leibniz’s arguments in the text are 
illuminated by claims made in the New Essays. 
 “On unities and transmigration” covers a good part of Leibniz’s metaphysics in a very 
short space. The focus for much of the text is the existence and nature of unities, including 
their modifications and changes, their perceptions, their fate, and that each unity has an 
organic body (that is, a body with infinitely structured organs). The text then turns to a 
consideration of the doctrine of transmigration, which Leibniz rejects after raising three 
separate objections to it. Given that these objections differ from those Leibniz used 
elsewhere, they will be the focus of the remainder of my paper. By way of providing some 
context, I shall outline (in section 1) the various objections to transmigration that can be 
found in that part of Leibniz’s corpus that has thus far been published. I shall then elucidate 
(in section 2) the objections found in “On unities and transmigration”. The complete 
transcription of this text, along with an English translation, can be found as an appendix to 
this paper. 
 
1. Leibniz on transmigration 
The doctrine of transmigration, or metempsychosis, holds that souls never die, and that at the 
end of one life they pass from one body to another, thereby giving rise to a new living thing. 
It was adopted by Pythagoras (c. 569-475 BCE) and Origen (185-254), endorsed by the 
heterodox thinker Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), and defended in Leibniz’s day by the 
Lurianic Kabbalist Francis Mercury van Helmont (1614-1698). Leibniz appears not to have 
entertained it at any point in his life, instead cleaving to an alternative account of the fate of 
bodies and souls inspired by the work of microscopists such as Marcello Malpighi (1628-
1694), Jan Swammerdam (1637-1680), and Antoni van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723), of which 
Leibniz was aware early in his career. Their discoveries, especially that of the foetus, 
convinced Leibniz that the bodies of living things had existed in a pre-formed state prior to 
birth, and that birth simply marked the point at which the animal’s pre-existing body enlarged 
and developed. This in turn led Leibniz to believe that death was no more than the same 
process in reverse, whereby an animal’s body shed its organs and became smaller in size. 
There was thus for Leibniz neither generation of a new animal nor death of an existing one, 
but merely the transformation of one and the same animal (development and envelopment). 
Another discovery, that of protozoa, convinced Leibniz that there was life everywhere, and 
that all creatures were animated prior to birth and would remain so after death, this in turn 
suggesting that all creatures were permanently ensouled (or alternatively that all souls were 
permanently embodied).5 From the 1670s until the end of his life, Leibniz often appealed to 
these ideas as representing a more plausible alternative to the doctrine of transmigration.6 
Moreover, for a good part of his career, Leibniz’s resistance to the doctrine of transmigration 
was based entirely on his alternative account. We know this because all of Leibniz’s 
                                                          
5 For further details of how the work of the early microscopists shaped Leibniz’s metaphysical thinking, see 
Alessandro Becchi, “Between learned science and technical knowledge: Leibniz, Leeuwenhoek and the school 
for Microscopists”, in Tercentenary Essays on the Philosophy and Science of Leibniz, eds. Lloyd Strickland, 
Erik Vynckier, and Julia Weckend (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2017), 47-79. 
6 For example, see “New system”, 27 June 1695, G IV 480/SLT 71 (and also the draft, G IV 474/LNS 24); 
“Letter on what is independent of sense and matter”, mid-June (?) 1702, A I 21, 346/LTS 246; “The principles 
of nature and grace”, 1714, G VI 601/LM 273. 
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philosophical writings up to 1690 have now been published,7 and in those we find that, prior 
to the 1690s, his discussions of transmigration are few and far between and typically follow 
the pattern just mentioned. Leibniz’s engagement with the doctrine of transmigration prior to 
the 1690s can be summarised as follows: 
In 1676 he claimed that “The transmigration of souls is adequately refuted by recent 
experiments on the pre-formed foetus”,8 albeit without further elaboration. In 1679 he 
suggested that Pythagoras did not believe in the doctrine of transmigration.9 In a letter from 
1683 he described Pythagoras’ doctrine of transmigration as “a corruption of a noble truth”.10 
In 1687 he claimed that one should believe in the transformation of one and the same animal 
rather than in the transmigration of souls,11 the former being “more reasonable”12 than the 
latter position, which is “mistaken”13 or amounts to saying nothing.14 In 1688 he sketched out 
the plan for a work that would show inter alia that metamorphosis (transformation) is to be 
favoured over metempsychosis (transmigration),15 and in another text from the same year he 
insists that transformation is to be preferred over transmigration.16 
Over the course of the 1670s and 1680s, then, Leibniz did not object to the doctrine of 
transmigration head-on; instead, he typically made a case for transformation of one and the 
same animal, and rejected transmigration seemingly on the grounds that it was a rival 
position. This was to change in the 1690s when Leibniz began to develop specific objections 
to the idea of transmigration that went beyond simply presenting it as an implausible 
alternative to his own belief in the transformation of animals. In the remainder of this section 
I shall consider two such objections, which I shall term “the argument from continuity” and 
“the argument from histories”. 
 “The argument from continuity” is arguably Leibniz’s most famous objection to 
transmigration.17 It is based on his principle of continuity, which holds that “any change from 
                                                          
7 The first four volumes of series VI of the Akademie edition bring together all of Leibniz’s philosophical 
writings up to 1690 (a separate volume contains the New Essays from 1703-5), and the first three volumes of 
series II contain all of Leibniz’s philosophical correspondence up to 1700. There is also some philosophical 
material to be found in series I, which collects together Leibniz’s general, political and historical 
correspondence; to date, 24 volumes of this series has been published, covering the period up to July 1705. 
8 “Excerpts from notes on science and metaphysics”, 18 and 22 March 1676, A VI 3, 394/DSR 47. 
9 Thus Leibniz claims that Pythagoras advanced his doctrine of metempsychosis “to adapt himself to the 
capacities of the common man, while among his disciples he reasoned in a completely different way.” Leibniz to 
unidentified recipient, 1679, A II 1, 778/http://www.leibniz-translations.com/cartesianism1679.htm [accessed 23 
August 2016] 
10 Leibniz to Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff, 24 December 1683/3 January 1684, A II 1, 850. 
11 “Many of them [sc. thinkers such as Aristotle, Hippocrates, Magnus, Bacon and Fernel] believed in 
transmigration, others in the traduction of souls, instead of noticing the transmigration that also transforms an 
animal already formed.” Leibniz to Arnauld, 9 October 1687, A II 2, 247/L 342 
12 “It is incomparably more reasonable, accordingly, to conceive of transformations of animated bodies than to 
imagine the passage of souls from one body to another, an ancient conviction which apparently comes only from 
transformation poorly understood.” Leibniz to Arnauld, 9 October 1687, A II 2, 256/L 346. 
13 “The ancients were mistaken in introducing the transmigration of souls instead of the transformations of the 
same animal which always preserves the same soul; they put metempsychoses pro metaschematismis [change of 
souls in place of change of shape].” Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 April 1687, A II 2, 189/AG 88. 
14 “The Pythagoreans have disguised the truth by their metempsychoses; instead of conceiving the 
transformations of one and the same animal, they believed or at least talked of the passages of an animal’s soul 
into another, which is to say nothing.” Leibniz to Foucher, 23 May 1687, A II 1, 202. 
15 “De arte characteristica ad perficiendas scientias ratione nitentes”, summer 1688?, A VI 4, 911. 
16 “And instead of the transmigration of souls (which has been imperfectly understood, I believe) one must 
maintain the transformation of animals.” “Specimen inventorum de admirandis naturae generalis arcanis”, 
1688?, A VI 4, 1624/PW 83. 
17 At least among recent commentators. It is discussed, for example, in C. D. Broad, Leibniz: An Introduction 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 84, 114-115; Stuart Brown, “Soul, body and natural 
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small to large, or vice versa, passes through something which is, in respects of degrees as 
well as parts, in between”,18 or more pithily that “nature never proceeds by leaps”.19 In 
accordance with this, all natural change, including that of the composition of the body, 
happens by degrees rather than all at once. Leibniz often insists that this allows for 
metamorphosis, that is, a change of shape or form, as occurs in the transformation of 
caterpillar to butterfly, but rules out the transmigration of the soul.20 After all, transmigration 
would involve the soul suddenly “jumping” bodies, effectively disappearing from one body 
and reappearing in another. The clearest example of this objection is to be found in a text on 
the philosophy of Spinoza (1707?), in which Leibniz writes: 
 
in reality there is no transition of the soul from body to body, except insofar as the 
body itself is insensibly changed. Metempsychosis would be against the rule that 
nothing takes place by a leap. The transition of the soul from body to body would be 
the same as a body going from place to place by a leap, without crossing through 
intermediate places. In all this there is a deficiency of argument.21 
 
In other iterations of this objection, Leibniz explains that the problem with transmigration is 
that it is violated by “order”. Hence he writes in 1715: 
 
As for metempsychosis, I believe that order does not allow it; it demands that 
everything be explicable distinctly, and that nothing happen by leap. But the passage 
of the soul from one body into another would be a strange and inexplicable leap.22 
 
The claim that transmigration would not be in keeping with order can be found much earlier 
in Leibniz’s work, for example in the draft of a letter to Electress Sophie written in 1694, 
wherein Leibniz writes: 
 
It is not that I believe in the transmigration of souls; but I believe in the 
transformation of one and the same animal, which sometimes becomes big, 
sometimes small, and takes various forms, as we see happen with silkworms when 
they become moths. This is more in keeping with order than transmigration.23 
 
However, Leibniz does not say enough here to enable us to conclude that transmigration is 
not in keeping with order because it would violate the law of continuity. (As we shall see, in 
“On unities and transmigration” Leibniz puts forward a number of objections based on the 
notion of order which have nothing to do with the law of continuity.) 
 As noted above, Leibniz developed a second objection to transmigration, “the 
argument from histories”. This is directed against the version of the doctrine defended by his 
friend, the Lurianic Kabbalist thinker Francis Mercury van Helmont. In addition to believing 
that souls transmigrate, van Helmont also claimed that there are a fixed number of souls 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
immortality”, The Monist 81 (1998), 573-590, at 581; and Dionysios A. Anapolitanos, Leibniz: Representation, 
Continuity and the Spatiotemporal (Dordrecht: Springer, 1999), 67-68. 
18 New Essays on Human Understanding, 1703-5, A VI 6 56/NE56. 
19 Leibniz to Sophie, 6 February 1706, G VII 567/LTS 348. See also FC 227/SLT 137; GM VI 248/L 447; A II 
3, 545/LDV 69. 
20 For example, he writes in the Monadology (1714): “Thus the soul only changes body bit by bit and by 
degrees, so that it is never stripped of all its organs all at once. In animals there is often metamorphosis, but 
never metempsychosis or transmigration of souls.” G VI 619/LM 28. 
21 “A Refutation Recently Discovered of Spinoza”, 1707?, RIS 76/RRDS 154-155 [translation modified]. 
22 Leibniz to Remond, 11 November 1715, G III 635/L 658 [translation modified]. 
23 Leibniz to Sophie, 3/13 September 1694, LH I 5, 2, 3–4/LTS 106. 
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which undergo a series of “revolutions” that always places them into bodies of the same 
species, such that a fish soul always returns in a fish body etc. As he put it in a text from 
1696: 
 
A human generation goes away, the same generation returns etc... 
The rivers run toward the sea and return to the sea, and the sea does not get filled; the 
[number of] fish does not decrease or increase, the same fish return.24 
 
Consequently, as there is always the same number of souls in circulation, the number of 
humans and every species of animal in the world remains constant. To this, Leibniz objects 
that historical records and census reports suggest that the population has in fact increased 
rather than remained the same: 
 
I had to doubt this [sc. Van Helmont’s doctrine] on the basis of histories, and had to 
believe that the world has not always been equally densely inhabited. It is also to be 
found, from the printed registers of births and deaths in the City of London, that after 
the end of the Great Plague numbers were made up not only by the addition of an 
extremely large number of births, but also by the addition of new inhabitants.25 
 
Consequently, van Helmont’s version of transmigration is undermined by experience. Leibniz 
was rather more conciliatory when writing to van Helmont himself, advising him only that 
his view required further verification: 
 
The Spanish have certainly destroyed the men of some islands of America. The 
question is merely whether it is true, according to your opinion, that when enough of 
some species is left to propagate the race, births are more frequent after a great 
number of deaths. This is something which deserves to be verified more exactly.26 
 
I take it that Leibniz’s decision to moderate his criticism of van Helmont’s doctrine of 
transmigration when writing to van Helmont himself is more likely due to his desire not to 
offend a friend than it is to him having softened his opposition to the doctrine. 
 
2. The objections from “On unities and transmigration” 
As we have seen, by the 1700s Leibniz had developed a series of objections to the doctrine of 
transmigration.27 It is notable, however, that he does not make use of any of them in “On 
                                                          
24 “Some of Mr. Helmont’s thoughts”, September 1696, A I 13, 708/LTS 128. 
25 “Thoughts on van Helmont’s doctrines”, first half of October (?), 1696, LTS 135. 
26 Leibniz to van Helmont, 18/28 October 1696, A II 3, 208. Van Helmont seems not to have responded to this. 
27 A third possible objection is hinted at in one text in which, having outlined his views on the transformation of 
one and the same animal, Leibniz goes on to suggest that the alternative view of transmigration is “contrary to 
the laws of nature”, though unfortunately he does not elaborate further. See Leibniz to Rabener, January (?) 
1698, A I 15, 261: “to speak more properly, not only the soul but also the animal itself continues to exist. 
Organs always remain joined to it. For how truly admirable is the nature of the machines of the divine craftsman 
that no force can destroy them. Consequently, just as generation is only the increase and so to speak the bringing 
forth into a larger theatre of an animal already living, so conversely is death to be thought of as only a sort of 
diminution, which some of the ancients have recognized also. Accordingly, we should think not of the 
μετεμψύχωσις [metempsychosis] of souls, a thing contrary to the laws of nature, but the μεταμόρφωσις 
[metamorphosis] of animals.” It is possible to see Leibniz as here referring rather obliquely to what I have 
termed the argument from continuity. Although the principle of continuity, upon which the argument from 
continuity is based, is a metaphysical principle rather than a law of nature as such, Leibniz appears to have held 
that nature and its laws were fashioned in accordance with it, from which it would follow that if transmigration 
violated the principle of continuity then it would violate the laws of nature as well. 
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unities and transmigration”, instead developing new ones which, as far as I can ascertain, 
were not employed again in subsequent writings. This may suggest that Leibniz was not 
happy with the objections, but a more plausible reason is that in this text Leibniz does not 
engage with transmigration simpliciter, as he typically does elsewhere, but instead concerns 
himself with three specific versions of it, namely: (1) where a soul is released by the 
destruction of its body and is then free to pass into another body; (2) where souls are 
exchanged without any destruction of bodies; and (3) where human souls (minds) are 
exchanged, again without any destruction of bodies. Each of Leibniz’s three objections is 
targeted at one of these versions of transmigration. We shall consider each in turn. 
 
2.1. Objection 1: the argument from distinct explanation 
In “On unities and transmigration”, the discussion of transmigration occurs after Leibniz asks 
“whether it is possible that there are some substances which pass from body to body in a 
certain order and others which are always attached to the same body.”28 His answer to that 
question, which thus constitutes his first objection to transmigration, is this:  
 
But I doubt this change could be distinctly explained, and consequently I doubt it is in 
conformity with order. For we would have to suppose the destruction of an organic 
body in order to deprive it of the soul, for every organic body has in it – by dint of 
reason – what it can fittingly have in it. And every organic body of nature, being 
infinitely enfolded, is indestructible. And the proof that it is infinitely enfolded is that 
it expresses everything.29 
 
Here Leibniz supposes that if transmigration were to occur, it would involve a soul first being 
released from its current body, which he implies could only happen if that body was 
destroyed. But as the body cannot be destroyed, souls could not be released from one body in 
order to pass into another. It is notable that Leibniz is here restricting himself to what is 
naturally possible, rather than what is possible per se:30 his point is that organic bodies cannot 
naturally be destroyed (and thus that souls cannot naturally be released from their body). The 
reason for this is to be found earlier in the text, when Leibniz explains that an organic body is 
indestructible on account of “the fact that the least part of the organic body is also organic, 
nature’s machines being folded in themselves to infinity. Thus fire and any other external 
forces can only ever disturb the outside.”31 While the natural destruction of bodies is ruled 
out, a non-natural destruction – which would involve them being annihilated by God – is not. 
Consequently, the objection says in effect that this particular form of transmigration, were it 
to occur, would involve a non-natural, i.e. miraculous event, and as such would not be 
amenable to distinct explanation. (The idea that a non-natural event would not be distinctly 
explicable, implicit in “On unities and transmigration”, is stated explicitly in the New Essays, 
where Leibniz distinguishes between “what is natural and explicable and what is miraculous 
and inexplicable”.32) And as a non-natural event, it would be contrary to the order that God 
has established. This allows Leibniz to feel entitled to reject this form of transmigration, for 
he asserts in the New Essays that “we are entitled to deny (within the natural order at least) 
                                                          
28 LBr 40 Bl. 22v. 
29 LBr 40 Bl. 23r. For a helpful discussion on why the soul is required for the body to express everything, see 
Pauline Phemister, “The souls of seeds”, in Leibniz’s Metaphysics and Adoption of Substantial Forms, ed. 
Adrian Nita (Springer: Dordrecht, 2015), 125-141, especially 137-139. 
30 This is actually evident from the way he poses his initial question, which asks whether transmigration can 
occur “in a certain order”, i.e. in a way consistent with the natural order of things that God has established. 
31 LBr 40 Bl. 22v. 
32 A VI 6, 66/NE 66. 
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whatever is absolutely unintelligible and inexplicable”, since “everything which is in accord 
with the natural order can be conceived or understood by some creature”.33 
It is surely noteworthy that Leibniz’s concern with this form of transmigration is only 
that it involves the destruction of the body. He does not touch upon – let alone object to – the 
passage of a soul to another body. His objection is simply that such a process could not get 
started. 
 
2.2. Objection 2:the argument from expression 
Leibniz’s second objection to transmigration tries to show that if a soul did transmigrate, it 
would have to do so as part of an exchange of souls, which then raises the question of 
whether this exchange would be expressed in bodies or not. He writes: 
 
Assuming that no new organic bodies are formed and that the old ones are not 
destroyed, what indication will we have to say that the soul of one organic body has 
gone into another, besides that two souls are not in the same organic body, and that 
there would thus have to be an exchange of souls? Moreover, this exchange of souls is 
noticeable in bodies or it isn’t: if it is not noticeable, it is contrary to order since the 
body must express everything. If it should be noticeable there, we would have to see 
how that might happen. What means are there of expressing the passage of a soul by 
the laws of mechanics?34 
 
Here Leibniz all but rules out the suggestion that a soul exchange would leave no mark on 
bodies: indeed, his commitment to the view that the body expresses everything, articulated 
here and elsewhere,35 surely leaves him unable to countenance such a scenario. So if there 
were to be an exchange of souls, Leibniz is committed to holding that the event would be 
expressed by bodies. This leads him to wonder how the passage of souls might be expressed 
in bodies by the laws of mechanics. While Leibniz’s language might suggest he is leaving the 
question open, it is not unreasonable to construe him as instead asking a rhetorical question 
which he does not expect to have an answer. In fact it is difficult to imagine otherwise. 
 
2.3. Objection 3: the argument from identity 
Leibniz’s final objection to transmigration seeks to show that even if some souls do 
transmigrate, the highest class of them, namely minds or “intelligences”, do not. For Leibniz, 
the category of “minds” includes not just human beings but also higher (superhuman) beings 
such as genii and angels;36 moreover, he insisted throughout his career that such beings were, 
like humans, always embodied,37 with God being the only mind that exists without a body.38 
Accordingly, it is reasonable to suppose that Leibniz’s objection to the transmigration of 
minds is intended to rule out the transmigration of any created mind whatsoever, even though 
the example he uses involves a human mind. The objection goes as follows: 
 
Now it would be possible for one and the same intelligence to pass from one body 
into another. In that case, the mechanical laws themselves would make reborn 
                                                          
33 A VI 6, 65/NE 65. 
34 LBr 40 Bl. 23r. 
35 For example G VI 617/LM 27. 
36 See for example G VI 605/LM 276. 
37 See for example Leibniz to Sophie, early(?) March 1706, K IX 174/LTS 357: “God alone is an intelligence 
separated from all body, whereas all other intelligences—Genies, Angels, and Demons—are accompanied by 
organic bodies in their way.” 
38 See for example G VI 619/LM 28: “neither are there any entirely separate souls, nor genies without bodies. 
God alone is entirely detached from body.” 
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elsewhere a life which continues my life, and an intelligence which claims for itself 
what has happened to me, its perceptions and the movements of its body (which 
mutually correspond) leading it to have thoughts that would, in effect, be the memory 
of the principal things that have happened to me, so that morally this intelligence 
would be me, and would continue as me. That seems possible, but it seems to me 
more in keeping with order that moral identity is always accompanied by a physical 
identity, and that each unity, being the universe in miniature, is governed also 
according to moral laws.39 
 
To understand this objection, we first need to understand Leibniz’s distinction between 
physical identity and moral identity, which can be found outlined in the New Essays. There, 
Leibniz claims that physical identity (understood as real identity rather than as the identity of 
the body),40 is grounded in the continuation of the same substance.41 Moral or personal 
identity, on the other hand, is that which confers moral responsibility on a substance, and thus 
makes it liable for reward and punishment. In the New Essays, Leibniz suggests that moral 
identity is grounded in self-consciousness,42 or memories that involve self-reference,43 that is, 
memories such as “I did this” or “this happened to me”.44 As only minds possess self-
consciousness and self-referring memories, only minds possess moral identity in addition to 
physical identity; lesser substances, such as animals, have only physical identity. This 
thinking is to be found in earlier writings, such as the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686),45 as 
well as later ones like the New Essays,46 suggesting that Leibniz would have held it also when 
writing “On unities and transmigration”. 
 With this in mind, let us now return to Leibniz’s final argument from that text: there 
we find him entertaining the possibility that a mind (“intelligence”) passes from one organic 
body to another, or rather that a mind passes into Leibniz’s own organic body, replacing his 
own which is transferred elsewhere. In such a case, he claims, the mind that passes into 
Leibniz’s body will end up with Leibniz’s memories. This would happen, we may suppose, 
by virtue of the pre-established harmony, which ensures that the replacement mind would 
have perceptions that correspond with those of Leibniz’s body, which itself expresses its own 
past and future states. In effect, then, the replacement mind in Leibniz’s body would, for 
moral purposes, actually be Leibniz, and would therefore be liable for reward and punishment 
based on actions that Leibniz himself had performed. An obvious worry with this scenario 
concerns the injustice of rewarding or punishing the replacement mind for actions that it took 
no part in, entirely on the basis of its non-veridical memories. But this is not the problem 
                                                          
39 LBr 40 Bl. 23r. 
40 See Remnant’s and Bennett’s notes on “physical identity” in NE xxii, and lxxxv-lxxxvi. 
41 A VI 6, 237-238/NE 237-238. See also Leibniz to Jacquelot, 28 April 1704, G III 474. 
42 A VI 6, 236/NE 236. 
43 A VI 6, 233/NE 233. 
44 In contrast, Locke located the identity of the human being in the continuation of the same life, or rather the 
continuation of the organization of the body (which persists through changes in constituent parts), and personal 
identity in consciousness, or psychological continuity. See John Locke, An Essay concerning Human 
Understanding (London: J. F. Dove, 1828), 218 and 220-221. 
45 “[T]he intelligent soul, knowing what it is and being able to say I, which says so much, not merely remains 
and subsists metaphysically ... but also remains the same morally and constitutes the same person. For it is the 
memory or the knowledge of this I which makes it capable of punishment and reward.” Discourse on 
Metaphysics, A VI 4, 1584/L 325 [translation modified]. “[M]inds must retain their personalities and their moral 
qualities, so that the City of God loses no person; they must particularly preserve a kind of reminiscence or 
consciousness or the power to know what they are, upon which depends the whole of their morality, penalties, 
and punishments.” Leibniz to Arnauld, 9 October 1687, A II 2, 258/L 347 [translation modified]. In the copy of 
the despatched letter, this was changed to “reminiscence, consciousness, or power...” 
46 See also Leibniz to Sophie, 29 November 1707, K IX, 288/LTS 363. 
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Leibniz himself raises. Instead, his concern is that, if an exchange of minds were to occur as 
described, it would mean that there would be moral identity in the absence of physical 
identity, which he considers to be not in keeping “with order”. Implicit here is Leibniz’s 
belief that order requires moral identity to be bound to physical identity. That belief is more 
explicit in the New Essays, when Leibniz considers a number of examples involving 
transmigrating minds. At the conclusion of one of these he writes: 
 
I acknowledge that if all the appearances of one mind were changed and transferred to 
another, or if God brought about an exchange between two minds by giving the 
visible body, appearances and states of consciousness of one to the other, then 
personal identity, instead of being tied to the identity of substance, would follow the 
constant appearances, which are what human morality must be heedful of.47 
 
Leibniz’s point here is that if transmigration were to occur among human beings, it would 
lead to cases where moral identity (referred to in the above as “personal identity”) is not tied 
to physical identity (“identity of substance”), and he goes on to claim that “this is not in 
conformity with the natural order”.48 Similarly, after considering another case of 
transmigration, in which consciousnesses transfer between minds, Leibniz writes: “I admit 
that if God brought it about that consciousnesses were transferred to other souls, the latter 
would have to be treated according to moral notions as though they were the same. But this 
would disrupt the order of things for no reason”.49 
 Leibniz thus holds that in the order of things, moral identity tracks physical identity, 
and since a transmigration of minds would upset this, it is contrary to order. So stated, the 
force of his objection to transmigration is not immediately obvious. Why is it “more in 
keeping with order that moral identity be always accompanied by a physical identity”, as he 
puts it in “On unities and transmigration”? One possible answer can be found in the New 
Essays, where Leibniz states that: 
 
According to the order of things, an identity which is apparent to the person 
concerned – one who senses himself to be the same – presupposes a real identity 
obtaining through each immediate transition accompanied by reflection, or by the 
sense of ‘I’; because an intimate and immediate perception cannot be mistaken in the 
natural course of things.50 
 
If we suppose that the same thinking was behind Leibniz’s remarks in “On unities and 
transmigration”, we can see that the problem at the heart of his third objection is that the 
replacement mind in Leibniz’s body would have Leibniz’s memories and therefore think that 
it is Leibniz (in the sense of being physically identical with Leibniz) even though it is not. In 
such a case, the replacement mind would be mistaken about its physical identity, because it 
would suppose – naturally, but mistakenly – that moral identity tracks physical identity. 
Leibniz’s assumption seems to be that since minds naturally suppose that moral identity 
tracks physical identity, it would be incongruous if the world had been so established as to 
make it so that this supposition was sometimes wrong, and as a result he concludes that the 
world almost certainly hasn’t been established that way, and that therefore the transmigration 
of minds almost certainly does not occur. This version of transmigration would thus violate 
what Leibniz called “the principle of order”, which ensures that “the more things are 
                                                          
47 A VI 6 244/NE 244 [translation modified]. 
48 A VI 6, 245/NE 245. 
49 A VI 6, 242/NE 242. 
50 A VI 6, 236/NE 236. 
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analyzed the more they satisfy the intellect”.51 Or to put it another way, this version of 
transmigration – which would involve God creating minds that naturally suppose moral 
identity tracks physical identity despite this not always being the case – would run counter to 
Leibniz’s non-negotiable belief that God has established things in the wisest way.52 
 
Conclusion 
“On unities and transmigration”, then, is a peculiar text in that Leibniz does not engage with a 
“generic” theory of transmigration, involving the bare idea of souls passing from one body to 
another, but instead tackles three specific versions of the doctrine, developing an objection to 
each of them. That he apparently did not discuss these versions of the doctrine in other works 
would adequately explain why he did not make use of the objections against them found in 
this text. There is thus no reason to suppose that Leibniz considered the objections weak. 
 As should be clear from the foregoing, Leibniz had a lifelong hostility towards 
transmigration of any form.53 What is perhaps surprising is that this hostility never hardened 
into a belief that transmigration was impossible.54 While Leibniz consistently opposed the 
doctrine of transmigration, he nevertheless conceded that the doctrine was possible, both in 
“On unities and transmigration” and in other writings, such as the New Essays.55 But as he 
put it in the New Essays, “not everything which is possible is therefore in conformity with the 
order of things”.56 And this, one feels, is the nub of the matter for Leibniz. Evidently, he 
believed that God could make souls transmigrate (by a miracle), but would not because he 
wished to preserve order in his creation.57 
  
                                                          
51 Leibniz to de Volder, 3 April 1699, A II 3, 545/LDV 71. 
52 I thus take it that Gabriele Tomasi is on firm ground when he writes “the relationship of dependence existing 
between moral identity and real identity is not of a logical kind; we are dealing rather with a metaphysical 
relationship, grounded in the way God has held it fitting to furnish the world he created. It is, in other words, a 
dependence which is justified in relation to the question “What order is suitable for divine wisdom?”.” Gabriele 
Tomasi, “What is person? Some reflections on Leibniz’s approach” in Individuals, Minds and Bodies, eds. 
Massimiliano Carrara, Antonio-Maria Nunziante, and Gabriele Tomasi (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004), 
265 n20. 
53 Though note that in the New Essays Leibniz concedes “If transmigration is not taken strictly, i.e. if anyone 
thought that souls remain in the same rarefied bodies and only change their coarse bodies, that would be 
possible, even to the extent of the same soul’s passing into a body of another species in the Brahmin or 
Pythagorean manner.” A VI 6, 233/NE 233. However, the version of the doctrine described here does not 
correspond with how transmigration has been traditionally understood. 
54 Nevertheless, it is sometimes claimed that Leibniz rejected the very possibility of transmigration; see for 
example Stewart Duncan, “Leibniz on Hobbes’s materialism”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41 
(2010), 11–18, at 16. 
55 As has been noted before; see Marc Elliott Bobro, Self and Substance in Leibniz (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2005), 
52. 
56 A VI 6, 233/NE 233. 
57 My thanks to Blandina Chaza, Daniel J. Cook, Pauline Phemister, and Julia Weckend for their helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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Appendix 1: untitled text (c.1702-5)58 
  
[LBr 40 Bl. 22r] 
 
 Il n’y auroit point de multitude s’il n’y avoit des veritables unites. Or les veritables 
unités ne doivent point avoir des parties, autrement elles ne seroient que des amas de ces 
parties, et par consequent des multitudes, et nullement des veritables unités. On peut même 
dire que les seules unités sont des Estres entierement reels; puisq les amas ou aggregés sont 
formés par la pensée, qui comprend à la fois telles et telles unités; et toute la realité des 
choses ne consiste que dans ces unités. 
 D’ou il s’ensuit  Les unites ne ayent point de parties on a sçauro contiennent ce qui est 
appellé ame dans les animaux, et entelechie dans les autres estres organiques 
Cela estant puisq il y a un changement quelques attributs modifications et quelques 
changemens de modification dans les choses, il y il faut que la source de cela cela resulte des 
modifications et changemens qui sont dans les unités. Et il faut bien aussi que ces unités 
contiennent quelq realité qui fasse leur diversité. Car la diversité dans un autrement ce 
seroient des riens. Il faut aussi qu’elles ayent des predicats qui les fasse differentes les unes 
des autres, et changeants en elles mêmes variées chacune et sujettes à quelq changement et 
susceptibles du changement. 
Or la varieté dans l’unité ou dans l’indivisible ne sçauroit estre autre chose que   est 
justement ce que nous appellons perception, et les ames ainsi est justement ce que nous 
opposons aux modifications de l’étendue, c’est à dire aux figures et mouvemens, et par 
consequent c’est ce que nous appellons perception, et quelques fois pensée, lors qu’il est 
accompagné de reflexion. De sorte qu’on voit bien que ces Unités ne sont autre que les ames 
ce qu’on appelle ame dans les animaux et entelechie ou et principe de vie dans les vivans, et 
Entelechie en general dans tout et Entelechie primitive dans tous les corps organiques, ou 
Machines naturelles, qui ont quelq Analogie avec les animaux. 
Or n’y ayant point moyen d’expliquer comment une unité a de l’influence sur l’autre 
et n’estant point raisonnable de recourir à une entremise perpetuelle une direction particuliere 
de dieu comme s’il donnoit tousjours aux Ames ou Unités ce qui des impressions qui 
respondent au Corps aux passions du corps; il ne reste que de dire que chaq unité exprime par 
sa propre nature et suivant son point de veue tout ce qui se passe dehors Ainsi il ne suffit pas 
De sorte que l’union de l’ame avec [LBr 40 Bl. 22v] son corps, où elle est dominante, n’est 
autre chose que l’accord spontanée de leur phenomenes. 
Il ne faut Et puisq on peut tousjours expliquer dans le corps par les loix mecaniques le 
passage d’une impression à l’autre, il ne faut point s’etonner que l’ame passe de même aussi 
d’elle même, en vertu de sa nature representative d’une perception à l’autre representation à 
l’autre, et par consequent de la joye à la douleur tout comme la situation du corps et de 
l’univers à l’egard de ce corps le demande. Aussi at-il esté bien remarqué par Socrate chez 
Platon qu' il y a un  que le passage de la joye à la que le passage ou trajet du plaisir à la 
douleur est fort petit. 
Les ames peuvent estre  ne peuvent jamais Il s’ensuit encor de tout cecy que les ames 
ne sçauroient perir naturellement, non plus que l’univers, et qu’il leur doivent tousjours rester 
des perceptions, comme elles en ont tousjours eues, tant qu’elles ont esté, puisq rien ne leur 
vient de dehors, et que tout se fait en elles dans une parfait spontaneité. 
Cependant il faut avouer qu’elles sont bien souvent dans un estat de sommeil, ou leur 
perceptions ne sont pas assez distinguées pour attirer l’attention et fixer la memoire. Mais 
comme chaque ame unité est le miroir de l’univers à sa mode, il est raisonnable de croire, 
                                                          
58 LBr 40 Bl. 22-3. 
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qu’il n’y aura point de sommeil eternel pour elle, et que ses perceptions se developpent dans 
un certain ordre, le meilleur sans doute qui soit possibile. C’est comme dans les 
crystallisations des sels confondus, qui se separent enfin et retournent à quelque ordre. 
Il faut dire encor suivant l’exacte correspondance de l’ame et du corps; que le corps 
organiq subsiste tousjours, et ne sçauroit jamais estre détruit, de sorte que non seulement 
l’ame, mais même l’animal doit demeurer. Cela vient de ce que la moindre partie du corps 
organiq est encor organiq; les machines de la nature estant repliées en elles mêmes à l’infini. 
Ainsi ny le feu ny les autres forces exterieures n’en sçauroient jamais deranger que l’écorce. 
On ne sçauroit tousjours determiner si certaines Masses sont animées ou entelechiées, 
par ce qu’on ne sçauroit tousjours dire si elles sont organiques forment un corps organiq ou si 
ce ne sont que des amas, comme par exemple je ne sçaurois rien definir du soleil, du globe de 
la terre, d’un diamant. 
Il y a de l’apparence que toutes les substances intelligentes creées ont un corps 
organiq qui leur est propre. Ce seroit pourtant une question, s’il n’est pas possible qu’il y en 
ait qui passent de corps en corps dans un certain ordre, et d’autres qui sont tousjours attachée 
à un même corps. 
 
[LBr 40 Bl. 23r] 
 
Mais je doute qu’on puisse expliquer distinctement ce changement, et par consequent 
je doute qu’il est conforme à l’ordre. Car il faudroit supposer la destruction d’un corps 
organiq, pour le priver de l’ame, car tout corps organiq en a par la raison qu’il en peut avoir 
sans inconvenient. Et tout corps organiq de la nature, estant infiniment replié, est 
indestructible. Et la preuve qu’il est infiniment replié, est qu’il exprime tout. De plus le corps 
doit exprimer l’estat futur de l’ame ou de l’Entelechie qu’il a et cela en exprimant son propre 
estat future. 
Supposé qu’il ne se forment point de nouveaux corps organiques & que les vieux ne 
se detruisent point, quelle marque aurons nous pour dire que l’ame d’un corps organiq est allé 
dans l’autre outre que deux ames ne sont point compatibles dans un meme corps organiq; et 
qu’il faudroit ainsi un echange d’ames. Et comme on ne sçauroit reconnoistre ce changement 
De plus cet echange d’ames se remarque dans les corps ou non, s’il ne s’y remarque pas, il est 
contre l’ordre car le corps doit tout exprimer. S’il s’y doit remarquer, il faudroit voir 
comment cela se peut faire. Quel moyen d’exprimer le passage d’une ame par les loix de 
mecaniq. 
On pourroit pourtant excepter les esprits, ou ce ne seroient pas les loix mecaniques 
mais des loix morales que marqueroient la translation et l’identité d’une ame avec l’autre. Car 
j’appelle esprits les Entelechies ou ames, qui sont susceptibles des verités eternelles, sciences 
et demonstrations, et qui peuvent estre considerés comme sujets d’un gouvernement tel qu’est 
celuy de la Cité de dieu dont le Monarque est la souveraine substance intelligence. Or il se 
pourroit faire qu’une même intelligence passat d’un corps dans l’autre autrement que par les 
loix mecaniques : en ce que les loix mecaniques mêmes fissent renaistre ailleurs une vie qui 
coninuât la mienne, et une intelligence qui s’attribuât ce qui est arrivé à moy; ses perceptions 
et les mouvemens de son corps (qui s’entre repondent) le menant à une imagination telle 
qu’en effect elle seroit la memoire du principal qui m’est arrivé, de sorte que moralement 
cette intelligence seroit moy, et me continueroit. Cela paroist possible, mais il me paroist plus 
conforme à l’ordre que l’identité morale soit tousjours accompagnée d’une identité physiq, et 
que chaq Unité, estant un miroir de l’univers l’univers en raccourci, soit bien gouvernée 
encor selon les loix de la morale. 
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Appendix 2: On Unities and Transmigration (c. 1702-5) 
 
If there were no true unities, there would be no multitude. Now true unities must not 
have parts otherwise they would be only accumulations of these parts, and consequently they 
would be multitudes, and not true unities at all. It may even be said that unities alone are 
entirely real beings, since the accumulations or aggregates are formed by the thought which 
includes such and such unities at the same time. And all the reality of things consists only in 
these unities. 
That being so, since there are some modifications and some changes of modification 
in things, this must be the result of modifications and changes in the unities. And these unities 
must contain some reality too, otherwise they would be nothing. They must also have 
predicates which make them different from each other, and capable of change. 
Now the variety in the unity, or in the indivisible, is precisely what we oppose to the 
modifications of extension, that is, to figures and motions, and consequently is what we call 
perception, and sometimes thought, when it is accompanied by reflection. So it is clear that 
these unities are nothing other than what are called “souls” in animals, “principle of life” in 
living things, and “primitive entelechy” in all organic bodies – or natural machines – which 
have some resemblance with animals. 
Now, as there is no way of explaining how one unity has influence on another, and as 
it is unreasonable to resort to invoking a particular direction of God, as if he always gave to 
souls or unities impressions which correspond to the body’s passions, it remains only to say 
that each unity expresses – by its own nature and according to its point of view – everything 
that happens outside. So the union of the soul with its body, in which it is dominant, is 
nothing other than the spontaneous agreement of their phenomena. 
And since the passage from one impression to another in the body can always be 
explained by mechanical laws, we should not be surprised that the soul likewise passes, also 
of itself, by virtue of its representative nature, from one representation to another, and 
consequently from joy to pain, just as the situation of the body – and of the universe with 
regard to this body – requires. And it was well noted by Socrates, according to Plato, that the 
passage or path from pleasure to pain is very short.59 
From all that it also follows that souls cannot perish naturally, any more than the 
universe, and that some perceptions must always remain in them, just as they have always 
had for as long as they have existed, since nothing comes into them from outside, and since 
everything happens in them in a perfect spontaneity. 
Yet it must be admitted that they are quite often in a state of sleep, in which their 
perceptions are not sufficiently distinguished to attract attention and establish memory. But as 
each unity is the mirror of the universe in its way, it is reasonable to think that there will be 
no eternal sleep for it, and that its perceptions develop in a certain order, doubtless the best 
that is possible. It is like in crystallisations of mixed salts that are finally separated and return 
to some order. 
It should even be said that, accordingly to the precise correspondence of the soul and 
body, the organic body always subsists, and can never be destroyed, so that not only the soul 
but also the animal must remain. This is due to the fact that the least part of the organic body 
is still organic, nature’s machines being folded in themselves to infinity. Thus fire and other 
external forces can only ever disturb the outside. 
We cannot always determine whether certain masses are animated or entelechied, 
because we cannot always say whether they form an organic body or are only accumulations, 
as for example I cannot decide anything about the sun, the globe of the Earth, or a diamond. 
                                                          
59 See Plato, Phaedo, 60b. 
15 
 
There is some probability that all intelligent created substances have an organic body 
which is proper to them. However, a question would be whether it is possible that there are 
some substances which pass from body to body in a certain order and others which are 
always attached to the same body. 
But I doubt this change could be distinctly explained, and consequently I doubt it is in 
conformity with order. For we would have to suppose the destruction of an organic body in 
order to deprive it of the soul, for every organic body has in it – by dint of reason – what it 
can fittingly have in it. And every organic body of nature, being infinitely enfolded, is 
indestructible. And the proof that it is infinitely enfolded is that it expresses everything. 
Moreover, the body must express the future state of the soul or entelechy that it has, and it 
does that by expressing its own future state. 
Assuming that no new organic bodies are formed and that the old ones are not 
destroyed, what indication will we have to say that the soul of one organic body has gone into 
another, besides that two souls are not in the same organic body, and that there would thus 
have to be an exchange of souls? Moreover, this exchange of souls is noticeable in bodies or 
it isn’t: if it is not noticeable, it is contrary to order since the body must express everything. If 
it should be noticeable there, we would have to see how that might happen. What means are 
there of expressing the passage of a soul by the laws of mechanics? 
Yet it would be possible to except minds, in which it would be not mechanical laws 
but moral laws which would record the transfer and the identity of one soul with another. For 
I call minds the entelechies or souls that have the capacity for eternal truths, sciences and 
demonstrations, and which may be considered as subjects of a government such as that of the 
City of God, whose monarch is the supreme intelligence. Now it would be possible for one 
and the same intelligence to pass from one body into another. In that case, the mechanical 
laws themselves would make reborn elsewhere a life which continues my life, and an 
intelligence which claims for itself what has happened to me, its perceptions and the 
movements of its body (which mutually correspond) leading it to have thoughts that would, 
in effect, be the memory of the principal things that have happened to me, so that morally this 
intelligence would be me, and would continue as me. That seems possible, but it seems to me 
more in keeping with order that moral identity is always accompanied by a physical identity, 
and that each unity, being the universe in miniature, is governed also according to moral 
laws. 
 
 
